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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
ROY WOMACK, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 970539-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF PLAINT IFF/APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ENTERED 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE JOHN L. BACKLUND, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This appeal is from the decision of the Fourth Judicial 
District court, Judge John C. Backlund, denying appellant's Motion 
to Suppress Evidence following a hearing and from final judgment of 
conviction of Possession of a Controlled Substance in a Drug Free 
zone, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§58-
37-8(1)(a)(iii) & 58-37-8(4)(a), following a conditional plea, on 
April 23, 1997 at which date Defendant/Appellant withdrew his prior 
not guilty pleas to both counts and entered No Contest Pleas. 
Statutory maximums were imposed and stayed pending the appeal 
Defendant/Appellant indicated he would be making. 
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Defendant/Appellant was instructed to file the appeal within 30 
days. Minute entry was made recording these events, however, 
judgment was not signed on that date. Findings and Judgment were 
later prepared by Appellant's counsel, submitted to the court and 
signed June 23, 1997. Notice of Appeal was made within 30 days of 
that date, August 20, 1997. The matter appears to be properly 
before the Court as Notice of Appeal was filed within thirty days 
of the date judgment was signed. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was there sufficient probable cause set forth in the affidavit 
in the support of the search warrant to provide the necessary 
probable cause for issuance of the search warrant? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah, Utah Code Annotated, §77-23-202. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from the decision of the Fourth Judicial 
District court, Judge John C. Backlund, denying appellant's 
Motion to Suppress Evidence following a hearing and from final 
judgment of conviction of Possession of a Controlled Substance in 
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a Drug Free zone, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §§58-37-8(1) (a) (iii) & 58-37-8(4) (a), following a 
conditional plea, on April 23, 1997 at which date 
Defendant/Appellant withdrew his prior not guilty pleas to both 
counts and entered No Contest Pleas, indicating an intention to 
appeal the court's denial of the motion to suppress. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff/Appellee stipulates to the facts as presented by 
the Defendant/Appellant in his Memorandum In Support of Motion to 
Suppress, with the following clarification, or additions: 
1. The package was addressed personally to the defendant, 
Roy Womack, but had the wrong address. 
2. That the sender, Eileen OfHara ("O'Hara"), contacted 
UPS about the wrong address, and gave to UPS personnel the 
correct address; however, did not change the addressee 
information. The package was to be delivered to the Defendant, 
at the corrected address. 
3. O'Hara contacted the Womacks by telephone at the 
original address to find out where the package was. 
4. Defendant went to the Womacks at the original address 
to find out where the package was. 
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5. Prior to the officers going with the UPS employee to 
the address with the package, the UPS employee contacted O'Hara, 
and advised her that the package would be delivered to the 
corrected address between the hours of 12:00pm and 3:00pm, and 
that the addressee, the Defendant, had to be personally present, 
with appropriate ID to receive the delivery. O'Hara told the UPS 
employee that she would "page" the defendant and make sure he was 
at the corrected address during those hours to receive the 
package between. 
6. Officers went with the UPS employee to the address in 
the delivery truck with the UPS employee. After arriving there, 
the officer gave the UPS employee the package, while they were in 
the cargo/package area of the UPS delivery truck. 
7. After the delivery was made, officer verified by 
description, and signature for the package, that the package's 
recipient was in fact the Defendant. 
8. Officers then waited 10 minutes before executing the 
search warrant. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Defendant/Appellant moves to suppress the evidence located 
during the execution of the search warrant based upon two general 
arguments: (1) that the affidavit was not sufficient to probable 
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cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and (2) that the 
search warrant itself is defective, in that it is an 
"anticipatory" search warrant. Plaintiff/Appellee maintains that 
the affidavit provided probable cause, and the search warrant was 
properly issued, despite the fact it was "anticipatory" in 
nature. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY UPHELD THE SEARCH WARRANT WHICH WAS 
BASED UPON PROBABLE CAUSE 
Defendant/Appellant attacks the affidavit in that it does 
not contain probable cause to believe that the Defendant lived at 
the location, and that there was no information stating that 
drugs would be located on the premises prior to the UPS 
delivering the package. 
In State v. Horton, 848 P2d 708, 711, the Utah Court of 
Appeals stated: 
[W]hen a warrant has been issued, the legal sufficiency of 
the underlying affidavit has already been determined by a 
magistrate, and the magistrate's determination is entitled 
to credence. [Quoting U.S. v. Cardall, 773 F2d 1128, 1133 
(10th Cir 1985). 
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In this case, a neutral judge reviewed the affidavit and 
found it sufficient to support the issuance of a search warrant. 
In reviewing the affidavit in support of the warrant, 
Plaintiff/Appellee points out the following: 
In Paragraph 2, the officer reported that the package was 
addressed to the Defendant, a Roy Womack, living at 120 West 1200 
North, in Orem, Ut. That address did not exist, and so the 
package was mistakenly delivered to 233 East 100 South, Orem, 
Utah, the address for the only Womack family in Orem which was 
listed in the phone book. 
In Paragraph 3, the officer stated: 
Eileen O'Hara was very irate concerning the delivery of her 
package and was told where the package was delivered and 
that the package would be recovered and delivered to the new 
address given to UPS by Eileen O'Hara. The new address of 
delivery given was 127 West 1200 North, Orem, Utah. 
Interestingly enough, though O'Hara was "irate" about where 
the package was delivered, and changed the location to where it 
was to be delivered, she did not change the name of the 
addressee—it remained the Defendant. Therefore, the package, 
which was known to contain a controlled substance, was to be 
delivered personally to the Defendant, but at the corrected 
address. This confirms that Defendant was a resident, or at 
least was able to personally and physically receive deliveries at 
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the corrected address. Just because an individual's name is not 
on the utilities bills, does not presumptively show that an 
individual does not live there. The officers confirmed that the 
Defendant lived at the residence, or at least physically received 
personal deliveries at the residence, by statements made by 
O'Hara, in requesting the package be sent to the Defendant at the 
corrected address. This information was sufficiently set forth 
in the affidavit for the magistrate to view and upon which to 
determine probable cause. 
State stipulates that the affidavit does not reference any 
possession of drugs, etc., on the premises at the time the 
affidavit was presented to the magistrate; however, that does not 
necessarily sound the affidavit's demise. Generally, Utah's 
appellate courts have held that the finding of probable cause in 
an affidavit is a "practical common sense" determination, based 
upon the "totality of the circumstances" as presented in the 
affidavit. See, State v Vigh, 871 P2d 1030 (???); State v 
Thurman, 846 P2d 1256 (Utah 1993); State v Hansen, 732 P2d 127 
(Utah 1987); State v Brooks, 849 P2d 640 (Utah App), cert denied, 
860 P2d 943 (Utah 1993; State v Purser, 828 P2d 515 (Utah App 
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1992); accord, Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213, 103 SCt 2317, 76 LEd 
2d 527 (1983). 
In the affidavit, the officer detailed: (1) the course in 
which the package had travelled prior to arriving in police 
custody [paragraphs 2-3], (2) the actions of the defendant and 
co-conspirator in the matter [paragraph 4], (3) the officers 
training and experience in cases where controlled substances are 
shipped through the mail and/or sold from a residence, and, 
though the exact quantity of controlled substance in the package 
is not specified, that the amount in the package exceeded the 
general personal use amount, and would yield a profit if sold on 
the street, and also that in residences from which drugs are sold 
that other controlled substances and paraphernalia are located 
[paragraphs 6-7], (4) what actions would be taken with the 
package in the immediate future [paragraph 8], and (5) what 
evidence the officer expected to locate as a result of the 
search, which included the package material, plus other 
controlled substances and paraphernalia [paragraphs 9-10, & 13]. 
It should be noted that the affiant was very specific in 
detailing that he desired to make a controlled delivery of the 
package, and then execute the warrant [see paragraphs 8 and 13]. 
The magistrate was not deceived in this fact, and based upon the 
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information presented in the affidavit, determined that probable 
cause for the issuance of a search warrant existed. 
The state maintains that the affidavit presented to the 
magistrate was sufficient to establish the requisite probable 
cause standard of the Utah and federal constitutions. 
POINT II 
THE ISSUANCE OF AN ANTICIPATORY SEARCH WARRANT 
WAS PROPERLY MADE 
The issue of an "anticipatory" search warrant seems to be a 
question of first impression in Utah. Defendant/Appellant 
propounds that persuasive case law exists from other 
jurisdictions that invalidate such warrants, and urges the Court 
to accept that position. He also suggests to the Court that 
Section 77-23-202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, ("UCA") 
holds against such warrants. Plaintiff/Appellee argues that 
section 77-23-202, UCA, does not hold such limiting language, and 
proffers to the Court case law of jurisdictions that uphold the 
validity of such warrants. 
Section 77-23-202, UCA, states: 
Property or evidence may be seized pursuant to a search 
warrant if there is probable cause to believe it: (1) 
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, (2) 
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has been used or is possessed for the purpose of being 
used to commit or conceal the commission of an offense; 
or (3) is evidence of illegal conduct. [Italics added.] 
Clearly, under section 77-23-202(1) and (2), it would appear 
that the language is in the past or present tense; however, 77-
23-202(3) does not contain such limiting language. It simply 
refers to the property or evidence being identified as evidence 
of illegal conduct. It does it specify when or where the 
evidence of illegal conduct must be seized, only how—as directed 
by the warrant. Therefore, under section 77-23-202(3), UCA, 
evidence of illegal conduct does not have to be in possession of 
a particular person, a suspect, and in fact can be in custody of 
the police, at the time the affidavit is presented to the 
magistrate. As long as the magistrate knows this, and that the 
evidence will be at a particular location, at some certain time, 
77-23-202, UCA, does not preclude the issuance of a warrant for 
the seizure. 
In this matter, it was judicially expedient to allow the 
delivery of the package before it was officially seized under 
authority of the warrant. The people of the State of Utah have a 
direct public interest in determining who is importing controlled 
substances into the state through the mail and package delivery 
businesses. They have a public interest in stopping the 
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importation, and prosecuting those who flood this state with 
illegal drugs- In this matter, the only way for the state to 
determine exactly who was receiving the illegal drugs was to 
perform a controlled delivery. Without the execution of a search 
warrant after the delivery, the state would not have been able to 
retrieve the evidence, arrest, nor prosecute the importer. 
In the case before the bar, the officers did exactly what is 
required of them to protect the constitutional rights of the 
Defendant/Appellant, while at the same time, seeking to enforce 
the drug laws of this state through aggressive efforts. The 
state maintains that section 77-23-202, UCA, does not limit a 
court's discretion of finding probable cause, and issuing a 
warrant, of anticipatory nature. 
State proffers for the court that many other jurisdictions 
have held that anticipatory search warrants do not violate 
provisions of their state and federal constitutions. In McNeill 
v Commonwealth, 395 SE2d 460, (Va App 1990), the Virginia court 
stated: 
Warrants, issued when the contraband which gives rise 
to the search is not yet at the premise to be searched 
have been designated "anticipatory search warrants," 
[footnote omitted] and have been declared to be lawful 
when the contraband to be seized is on a sure course to 
its destination. United States v Goodwin, 854 F2d 33 
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(4th Cir 1988); United States v Washington, 852 F2d 
803 (4th Cir), cert denied, 488 US 974, 109 SCt 512. 
102 LEd 2d 547 (1988); United States v Hale, 784 F2d 
1465 (9th Cir 1986); United States v Lowe, 575 F2d 
1193 (6th Cir), cert denied, 439 US 869. 99 SCt 198, 58 
LEd 2d 180 (1978); United States ex rel Beal v Skaff, 
418 F2d 430 (7th Cir 1969). To be valid, however, 
"there must be probable cause to believe that the items 
to be seized will be at the place to be searched at the 
time the warrant is executed. State v Gutman, 670 P2d 
1166, 1172 (Alaska Ct App 1983). The probable cause 
requirement is met when "the evidence creates 
substantial probability that the seizable property will 
be on the premises when searched." Id. [Other citation 
omitted.] McNeill, 395 SE2d at 462. 
In this matter, the package was on a sure course to its 
destination. The Defendant/Appellant, personally, and his co-
conspirator, made sure that the package was to be delivered to 
the Defendant personally at the location to be searched. The 
magistrate was made aware of this fact through the affidavit's 
information. 
In State v Wine, 787 SW2d 31, (Tenn Crim App 1989), the 
court upheld the anticipatory warrant, and stated: 
Our Supreme Court has embraced the use of "anticipatory 
search warrants." State v Coker, 746 SW 2d 167 (Tenn 
1987). Such warrants do not violate the fourth 
amendment if they are executed following the delivery 
of the contraband. [Secular citation omitted.] The 
affidavit should inform the magistrate that the known 
or suspected contraband will be delivered in the 
immediate future and the basis of the affiant's 
knowledge that the item will be delivered. See, United 
States v Outland, 476 F2d 581 (6th Cir 1973). Following 
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the delivery of the illegal substance , the warrant 
ripens and the search may proceed. While it is not 
crucial to the validity of this search, it is 
preferable that the warrant explicitly condition the 
execution upon the occurrence of a specified event. 
State v Wine, 787 SW2d at 33. 
In this matter, the affidavit set forth that the package was 
to be delivered in the immediate future, and the affiant's 
knowledge that the package would be delivered. The officer was 
in possession of the package, and would be directly involved in 
the delivery with UPS employees. Additionally, the warrant 
clearly expressed that the warrant could not be executed until 
after the package's delivery. 
In State v Engel, 465 NW2d 787, (SD 1991), the court found: 
According to the clear weight of authority, an 
anticipatory search warrant based on a controlled 
delivery of contraband to occur in the near future is 
not unconstitutional per se. United States v Garcia, 
882 F2d 699 (2nd Cir), cert denied sub nom Grant v 
United States, US , 110 SCt 348, 107 Led 2d 336 
(1989); United States v Dorhofer, 859 F2d 1195 (4th 
Cir), cert denied, 490 US 1005, 109 SCt 1639, 104 LEd 
2d 155 (1989); United States v Goodwin, 854 F2d 33 (4th 
Cir 1988); United States v Hale, 784 F2d 1465 (9th 
Cir), cert denied, 479 US 829, 107 SCt 110, 93 LEd 2d 
59 (1986); United States v Lowe, 575 F2d 1193 (6th 
Cir), cert denied, 439 US 869. 99 SCt 198, 58 LEd 2d 
180 (1978); United States ex rel Beal v Skaff, 418 F2d 
430 (7th Cir 1969); Johnson v State, 617 P2d 1117 
(Alaska 1980); People v Glen, 30 NY 2d 252, 331 NY 2d 
656, 282 NE 2d 614, cert denied, sub nom Baker v New 
York, 409 US 849, 93 SCt 58, 34 LEd 2d 91 (1972); State 
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v Gutman, 670 P2d 1166, (Alaska Ct App 1983); Alvidres 
v Superior Court, 12 Cal App 3d 575, 90 Cal Rptr 682 
(1970). See also, [Secular citation omitted.], Illinois 
v Andreas, 463 US 765, 1034 SCt 3319, 77 LEd 2d 1003 
(1983). Engel, 465 NW2d at 789. 
The court also reiterated that the warrant should be 
specific in limiting the conditions that govern the warrant's 
execution. Quoting, United States v Garcia, 882 F2d 699 (2nd 
Cir) , cert denied sub nom Grant v United States, US , 110 
SCt 348, 107 Led 2d 336 (1989), the court directed: 
When an anticipatory warrant is used, the magistrate 
should protect against premature execution by listing 
in the warrant conditions governing the execution which 
are explicit, clear and narrowly drawn so as to avoid 
misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents. 
[Italics added by Engel court] Garcia, 882 F2d at 703-
704. 
Again, in this case, the magistrate was aware that the 
package was to be delivered, and that the warrant would be 
anticipatory in nature. Additionally, the magistrate explicitly 
limited the discretion of the officers in when to execute the 
warrant, by including in it the command that the search occur 
following the package's delivery. 
The Plaintiff/Appellee maintains that the search warrant was 
validly issued, based upon probable cause, and even though it was 
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"anticipatory" in nature, complied fully with the requirements of 
Section 77-23-202, UCA, and the Utah, and Federal, constitutions. 
POINT III 
OFFICERS RELIED IN "GOOD FAITH" ON SEARCH WARRANT 
Of additional argument, Plaintiff/Appellee proffers to the 
court that the evidence should not be suppressed, as the officers 
acted in good-faith on a judicially issued search warrant. In 
the matter at bar, the officer submitted the affidavit to a 
neutral judge for his review, and determination of probable 
cause. Upon reviewing the affidavit, Judge Burningham found that 
the affidavit fulfill the probable cause requirement. Finding 
such, Judge Burningham issued the search warrant authorizing the 
search of Defendant's place of residence or, location for 
personally receipt of UPS deliveries. 
The United States Supreme Court's decision of U.S. v. Leon, 
468 US 897 (1984), established a "good faith" rule which 
precludes the exclusion of evidence seized by an officer when 
acting in good faith upon a warrant. 
In State v. Horton, supra, the Utah Court of Appeals stated: 
Evidence obtained by officers acting in good faith 
objectively and reasonably relying on a search warrant 
issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, need not be 
excluded even if the warrant is subsequently invalidated by 
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a lack of probable cause. [Citing Leon, supra at 922.] 
There is a presumption that when an officer relies upon a 
warrant, the officer is acting in good faith. [Citing 
Cardall, supra at 1133] It is only when the officer's 
reliance is "wholly unwarranted" that good faith is absent. 
[Citation list omitted.] . . . . 
Leon describes four scenarios in which the exclusionary rule 
applies and good faith cannot be found: (1) the issuing 
magistrate is misled by the information in the affidavit 
that affiant knew was false or would have known was false 
except for his reckless disregard of the truth; (2) the 
issuing magistrate wholly abandons his judicial role and 
fails to perform his neutral and detached function; (3) the 
warrant is based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of 
probable cause as to render official belief in its existence 
entirely unreasonable; (4) the warrant is so facially 
deficient that it failed to particularize the place to be 
search or the things to be seized, the executing officer 
cannot presume it to be valid. Leon, 4 68 US at 923. 
Defendant/Appellant has failed to show that any one of the 
four criterion for rejection of the good-faith execution of the 
warrant are present. In this matter, the officers who executed 
the search were acting in good faith upon the issued search 
warrant of a neutral magistrate, which granted them authority to, 
make the delivery, and then execute the warrant. The evidence 
obtained as a result of the search is admissible, and not subject 
to suppression. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee submits that the search warrant was properly upheld 
by the trial court because it was supported by probable cause and 
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because an "anticipatory search warrant" can be a valid warrant 
if certain conditions are met, which were met here. 
Appellee submits that Appellant's conviction should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this ffftk day of 1 9 9 8 . 
"JMJA- 4j 
Laura' H. Cabanilla 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
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